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Introduction
One of the characteristic features of systems thinking can be seen in its unifying
approach, where organisms and technological artifacts, ecological relations and
man-made infrastructures shall all be described with a common set of concepts.
As a consequence, systems thinking can destabilize traditional western ontologies,
even those that seemed to have essential value for ethical and political orientation:
The very concepts of ‘Nature’ and ‘Life’ itself are rewritten by the historical
influences and epistemological shifts of systems theory.
This becomes especially significant within two distinctive yet interwoven
fields of knowledge: environmentalism and artificial life. As the discourse of
‘global warming’ illustrates, the impact of systems thinking is not limited to
scientific research but on the contrary popularized on a global scale. To
understand the historical interconnection of systems thinking with the rise of the
ecological paradigm, it is important to see how central elements of systems
thinking can be traced back to the emerging ideas of ecological thought in the
latter half of the 19th century, and how this thought assumes its current shape
under the influence of the media technology of the computer in 20th century.
The concepts of ‘Nature’ and ‘Life’ are thus fundamentally irritated by the
inclusion of the artificial. In particular, the understanding of natural processes and
qualities as well as the concept of ‘life itself’ become dislocated under the
influence of systems thinking combined with computer technologies of modelling,
simulation, and manipulation. Furthermore, as we will discuss later with the
prominent example of ‘Game of Life’, it can be argued that the rise of ‘games’ as
part of computer culture since the early 1970s is a significant landmark for the
popularization of systems thinking as well as for the transformation of concepts of
‘life itself’.
Risk and Closure
Starting with ‘Nature’, the globalized geopolitical, economic, and ecological
crises of the 20th century make evident that space as well as time for humankind
as a biological species might be limited. Within geology, the ecological effects of
this historical development have led to the assumption of an epochal shift from
the holocene to the “anthropocene”.1 The holocene, which had provided the
climatic conditions for the development of stable cultures and civilizations, is
assumed to be superseded by the anthropocene, as indicated by a significant
1

Cf. Paul J. Crutzen, “Geology of Mankind,” Nature, 415 (3. Jan. 2002): 23; Jan
Zalasiewicz et al., “Are We Now Living in the Anthropocene?” GSA Today, 18.2
(2008): 4–8.
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increase of CO2 found in air entrapments of the arctic ice since the end of the 18th
century. Since then, population growth and industrialization with increasing
consumption of fossil energies and other natural resources lead to the situation
that human behavior engenders significant changes within the biosphere. For the
first time, man made history and natural history converge in a paradox way, only
to confirm the long standing tradition of theories that assume a circular causality
between anthropological and geophysical processes, ranging from ancient
cosmogonies over the romantic concept of ‘Weltseele’ and Hegel’s ‘Weltgeist’ to
Vernadsky’s ‘noosphere’ or Teilhard de Chardin’s ‘omega point’, also including
versions of Gaia theory that have become influential for ecologic thinking. It is
thus not by coincidence that ecology is close to spiritual affairs.
The anthropocentric perspective seems the more inevitable as in the
context of globalization, ecological damages amount to a self-impairment of
world society. At present, ecological hazards tend to become universal and
irreversible, and are moreover supposed to yield boomerang effects, sooner or
later turning back on their originators on a global scale. In this context, Ulrich
Beck has developed the concept of “world risk society,” where global conflicts
get more and more centred on the distribution of risks rather than the distribution
of resources.2 According to the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, the concept
of risk has to be distinguished not from the notion of safety, but from the concept
of endangerment: External dangers are not caused by the affected person or
institution but are attributed to an intransparent environment; the notion of risk,
on the other hand, links an undesirable situation to some previous decision, which
could have been made otherwise.3 Contingencies are thus transformed into
potential consequences of conscious behavior, so that occurrences such as
hurricanes or floods might become symptoms of anthropogenic climate change.
Mediated by the concept of global risk, the most influential Aristotelian
distinction between physis (following internal goals) on the one hand and téchne
(following human purposes) on the other – which lay at the heart of the distinction
between nature and culture – in effect collapses. In the anthropocene driven by a
world risk society, human decision making and control gain vital importance on a
global scale, while nature as an independent causal force and element in its own
right paradoxically disappears. Essentially the same diagnosis is attained with
respect to technoscientific endeavours such as genetic engineering and synthetic
biology, where the distinction between natural and artificial objects is also
increasingly blurred. Thus on the macro level of ecological risk as well as on the
micro level of bio-technological mastery, “life itself” becomes a technological
2

3

Cf. Ulrich Beck, Weltrisikogesellschaft. Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Sicherheit
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 2008).
Cf. Niklas Luhmann, Soziologie des Risikos (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2003), 30f.
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enterprise. Media theorist Marshall McLuhan links this modern condition of
ecology to the historical moment of space exploration:
Perhaps the largest conceivable revolution in information occurred
on October 17, 1957, when Sputnik created a new environment for
the planet. For the first time the natural world was completely
enclosed in a man-made container. At the moment that the earth
went inside this new artifact, Nature ended and Ecology was born.
‘Ecological’ thinking became inevitable as soon as the planet
moved up into the status of a work of art.4
In this passage, McLuhan draws on a topological inversion: man is no longer
surrounded by nature, which is instead encircled by human technology. The
exclusion of nature from society turns into its complete technical inclusion or
enclosure, as it were, in an artificial container that is represented both by the
Sputnik’s shape and by its orbit. In terms of this picture, the era of ecology ends
that of nature, and ecology is a matter of technology and art. Alluding to
Shakespeare as well as military terminology, the globe becomes a theatre which
allows no external perspective. That there are no spectators but only actors, as the
title of McLuhan’s text suggests, again points to the central notion of closure:
There is no outside of society resp. technology.
Not by coincidence, the Sputnik also is a symbol of cold war; the
notorious ‘shock’ that supposedly accompanied its appearance for the Western
World in the context of technology and arms race is associated with a historical
situation characterized by strict external boundaries (Iron Curtain) and internal
paranoia (Manchurian Candidate) of political blocks, a climate which was surely
inspiring for cybernetic systems thinking with its fascination by operational
closure and autopoiesis.
Ecology: Life in space and time
While McLuhan surely provides a clear sighted definition of modern systems
thinking, the latter’s historical roots can be traced back to ecological ideas
emerging within geography and biology in the second half of the 19th century. In
the following sections, we shall highlight some important concepts and
developments in this complex discoursive field which are related to our argument
– without claiming to provide a thorough or complete history of ecology, of
course. Central for ecological thought is the assumption that organisms enter into
4

Marshall McLuhan, “At the moment of Sputnik the planet became a global theater in
which there are no spectators but only actors,” Journal of Communication, 24.1 (1974):
48–58, 49. Actually, Sputnik I was launched on October 4, 1957.
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functional relations to their surroundings und thus cannot be studied in isolation,
an idea which is constitutive for the first definition of ecology given by the
German biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) in 1866.5 Inspired by Darwin’s
theories of descendence and natural selection, Haeckel develops a strictly
mechanist theory, according to which the morphology of organisms and the
development of species are completely determined by environmental factors he
calls conditions of existence (“Existenz-Bedingungen”), encompassing inorganic
factors such as soil and climate as well as organic factors which are mainly given
by the surrounding organisms.
Ecological considerations like these allow a fundamental shift of focus
from the evolutionary relation between individual organisms and species under
the determining influence of their milieus towards collective forms of life in a
given spatial environment. In the context on his work on Frisian oyster banks, the
German zoologist Karl August Möbius (1825-1908) introduces the concept of
biocoenosis (“Lebensgemeinde”), which foregrounds the complex interactions
and interdependencies of co-existing individuals and species.6 In his seminal
paper “The Lake as a Microcosm” Stephen A. Forbes uses the notion of
‘community of interest’ as a central point of ecological reference.7 Corresponding
assumptions are found in the context of botany and plant geography. The first and
most influencing text book on ecology published by the Danish botanist Eugen
Warming (1841-1924) draws on the notion of ‘plant community’. Warming’s
“Plantesamfund. Grundtræk af den økologiske Plantegeografi” (1895) is
translated to German in 1896 and to English in 1909 (“Ecology of Plants. An
Introduction to the Study of Plant-Communities”). The German limnologist
August Thienemann postulates an organic unity between biocoenosis and biotope
(“Lebensraum, Milieu”) in 1916.8

5

6

7

8

Ernst Haeckel, Generelle Morphologie der Organismen. Allgemeine Grundzüge der
organischen Formen-Wissenschaft, mechanisch begründet durch die von Charles
Darwin reformirte Descendenz-Theorie, Bd. 2: Allgemeine Entwickelungsgeschichte
der Organismen. Kritische Grundzüge der mechanischen Wissenschaft von den
entstehenden Formen der Organismen, begründet durch die Descendenz-Theorie
(Berlin: Reimer, 1866), 286ff.
Karl August Möbius, Die Auster und die Austernwirthschaft (Berlin: Wiegandt,
Hempel & Parey, 1877).
Stephen A. Forbes, “The Lake as a Microcosm,” Bull. of the Scientific Association
(Peoria, IL), (1887): 77–87.
Cf. Kurt Jax, “Holocoen and Ecosystem – On the Origin and Historical Consequences
of Two Concepts,” Journal of the History of Biology, 31 (1998): 113–142.
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At the beginning of the 20th century, the shift from classical autecological
to synecological approaches9 combines with philosophical ideas of holism and
organicism, which is reflected by such concepts as the “holocoen” developed by
the entomologist Karl Friederichs (1878-1969), or the ecological gestalt-systems
(“ökologische Gestalt-Systeme”) of Richard Woltereck (1877-1944).10 Drawing
on Frederic E. Clements’ (1874-1945) work on the evolutionary succession of
plant communities,11 the South African ecologist John Phillips promotes the
concepts of “complex organisms” resp. super-organisms,12 combining views of
Clements with the theory of holism popularized by the South African statesman,
general and philosopher Jan Christian Smuts (1870-1950).13
The central holistic assumption of the priority of some (physical,
biological, or social) ‘whole’ over its ‘parts’ is reflected not only in ecological
theories of super-organisms from animal and plant collectives to some versions of
the Gaia theory developed by James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis in the 1960s
and 1970s.14 Holistic and vitalist thought also prepare the ground for what might
be called proto-constructivist theories of the relation between organisms and their
environments. In particular, the determining influence of the milieu originally
suggested by Haeckel is called into question. In Haeckel’s mechanistic
framework, the morphology and dynamics of life are supposed to be completely
reducible to causas efficientes of the physical world imposed on some organism.
Contrary to this claim, the Scottish physiologist John S. Haldane (1860-1936) in
9

The terms “Autökologie“ and “Synökologie“ were introduced around 1900 by Carl
Schröter, see Carl Schröter and Oskar von Kirchner, Die Vegetation des Bodensees,
Vol. 2, (Lindau: Verein für Geschichte des Bodensees und seiner Umgebung, 1902).
10
Cf. Jax, “Holocoen and Ecosystem.”
11
Frederic E. Clements, Plant Succession. An Analysis of the Development of Vegetation
(Washington 1916); Frederic E. Clements, “Nature and Structure of the Climax,”
Journal of Ecology, 24 (1936): 252–284.
12
John Phillips, “Succession, Development, the Climax, and the Complex Organism: An
Analysis of Concepts. Parts I-III,” Journal of Ecology, 22.2 (1934): 554–571; 23.1
(1935): 210–246; 23.2 (1935): 488–508.
13
On the historical relations of ecological thought to imperialism and colonialism, see
Peder Anker, Imperial Ecology. Environmental Order in the British Empire, 1895-1945
(Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 2001). On the affinities of the
German holistic tradition around Thienemann and Friederichs to geopolitics and even
fascistic ideologies of blood and soil, see Benjamin Bühler, “Zukunftsbezug und
soziale Ordnung im Diskurs der politischen Ökologie,“ Zeitschrift für
Kulturwissenschaften, 2009/2: 35–44, 38f.
14
Cf. Bruce Clarke, “Neocybernetics of Gaia: The Emergence of Second-Order Gaia
Theory,“ In Gaia in Turmoil: Climate Change, Biodepletion, and Earth Ethics in an
Age of Crisis, edited by Eileen Crist and H. Bruce Rinker (Cambridge: MIT Press,
2009), 293–314.
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an early paper from 1884 points to the purpose driven and goal oriented behavior
of living beings and argues that the causal link between the organism and its
environment has to be thought of in terms of a reciprocal instead of a one way
relation.15 Similar considerations lead the Baltic zoologist Jakob Johann von
Uexküll to the assumption that the environment is not simply given as an
objective milieu at all, but rather construed by each organism in accordance with
its perceptive and motor faculties. Thus the worlds of a cow, a tick, and a black
bird differ substantially, although these animals might be found in spatial vicinity.
In order to account for these differences, Uexküll draws a systematic distinction
between the terms “Umwelt” (environmental world), which is a essentially the
projection of an organism’s construction plan (“Bauplan”), and “Außenwelt”
(external world), which can only be construed by a detached observer.16 The
systemic relation between a living being and its “Umwelt” is analyzed by Uexküll
as a feedback loop between perceptive and motor activities and their respective
environmental correlates. The concept of linear causality following the model of
the unconditioned reflex is thus replaced by the cybernetic idea of circular
causality – Uexküll uses the term “Funktionskreis” (functional circle) – as general
explanatory principle for the relation between life and its milieu.17
Ecoystems
Thus at the beginning of the 20th century, basic elements of a proto-cybernetic
view of ecology as systems theory are already widely established, when the term
“ecosystem” is introduced by Arthur George Tansley (1871-1955) in 1935.18
Tansley develops the concept in a critical discussion of the holistic approaches of
Clements and Phillips.19 For Tansley, an ecosystem consists of both biotic and
non-biotic elements such as soil or water, atmosphere and climate; he therefore
rejects the notions of complex or super-organisms with their vitalist implications,
proposing the term “quasi-organism” instead. With respect to the ontological and
epistemological status of ecosystems, Tansley furthermore argues that they are
15

Cf. John Scott Haldane, “Life and Mechanism,” Mind, 9.33 (1884): 27–47.
Johann Jakob von Uexküll, Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere (Berlin: Julius Springer,
1909), 1–10, 191–196, 248–253 et. pass.
17
Cf. Johann Jakob von Uexküll, Theoretische Biologie (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1928),
ch. 5.
18
The term “ecosystem” was actually suggested to Tansley in the early 1930ies by Arthur
Roy Clapham, then a young colleague of Tansley’s at Oxford; cf. A. J. Willis, “The
Ecosystem. An Evolving Concept Viewed Historically,” Functional Ecology, 11.2
(1997): 268–271, 268.
19
George Arthur Tansley, “The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms,”
Ecology, 16.3 (1935): 284–307.
16
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not given or objective entities, but ‘mental isolates’.20 The identification of
ecosystems relies on heuristic boundaries that are introduced by an observer
rather than representing real physical closures. The first consequent application of
the ecosystem concept is ascribed to Raymond Laurel Lindeman (1915-1942),
who in a seminal study scrutinizes the trophic dynamics of a small lake in
Minnesota, taking the lake as an energy system made up of living and non-living
elements.21 Lindeman’s use of quantitative and statistical methods is inspired by
his teacher, the noted limnologist George Evelyn Hutchinson (1903-1991).
Hutchinson later takes part in the Macy Conferences and publishes a paper on
“Circular Causal Systems in Ecology”.22
Historically, the notion of ecosystem thus reflects an important shift in
ecological thinking. The ecosystem concept made possible a reconfiguration of
central assumptions developed in the frameworks of holism and vitalism,
seemingly avoiding teleological and metaphysical implications while at the same
time allowing to maintain basic explanatory principles such as the irreducibility of
the whole to its parts or the existence of emergent properties. In terms of
ecosystems, nature becomes an object of mathematical, technical and economic
analysis, and ecology turns into a knowledge which is essentially concerned with
resource management. In this form, ecosystem thinking became institutionalized
as the most influencing branch of ecology. One of its renowned proponents is
Eugene P. Odum, who advocates and further develops the ecosystem concept in
his textbook Fundamentals of Ecology. First published in 1953, this book
remained the standard work of academic teaching until the 1970s.23 The book was
co-authored by Eugene’s brother Howard T. Odum, who also was a pioneer of
ecosystem ecology and, like Lindeman, a disciple of Hutchinson. Mainly under
the influence of Howard T., the Fundamentals, especially in their third edition of
1971, make extensive use of cybernetic concepts and vocabulary such as input

20

Ibid. 299f.
Raymond L. Lindeman, “The Trophic-Dynamic Aspect of Ecology,” Ecology, 23.4
(1942): 399–417; on the background of this paper and Lindeman’s work, see Robert E.
Cook, “Raymond Lindeman and the Trophic Dynamic Concept in Ecology”, Science,
New Series 198.4312 (1977): 22–26.
22
Cf. Peter J. Taylor, “Technocratic Optimism, H. T. Odum, and the Partial
Transformation of Ecological Metaphor after World War II,“ Journal of the History of
Biology, 21.2 (1988): 213–244, 215ff.
23
Eugene P. Odum and Howard T. Odum, Fundamentals of Ecology (Philadelphia: W.B.
Saunders, 1953; 2nd ed., 1959; 3rd ed., 1971; 4th ed., 1983, 5th ed., 2005) The book
was translated in more than thirty languages. On the reception of the Fundamentals, see
Joel B. Hagen, “Teaching Ecology during the Environmental Age, 1965-1980,“
Environmental History, 13.4 (2008): 704–723.
21
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and output relations, control and feedback, organization and complexity to
describe the flows of energy and material in natural systems.24
Eugene P. Odum did not share his brother’s addiction to energetic
reductionism, but he surely also was a technocratic optimist. Influenced by his
father Howard D. Odum, a noted sociologist, and by the political visions of the
New Deal, Eugene P. Odum understood ecology as a theory with broad
implications, bridging between natural and social systems, and believed in the
possibility of sustainable resource management. Accordingly, he favored such
biological concepts as mutualism and co-operation over competition.25
In the 1950s and 1960s, ecosystem ecology, which had so far been a rather
technical academic subdiscipline of biology, enters into complex relations with
environmentalism as a new form of popular and political concerns about the
conditions of existence under global industrialization and capitalism. Ecological
hazards caused by smog, the use of pesticides, radioactive fallout, and ecocidal
warfare, combined with global shortages of grain and oil reserves, led to a
growing public awareness of environmental problems.26 One of the most
suggestive settings for the popularization of ecological consciousness was the
planetary perspective offered by space exploration, which is reflected by
McLuhan’s recourse to the Sputnik. In 1965, the economist Kenneth E. Boulding
coined the metaphor of “spaceship earth” and contrasted the model of a wasteful
“cowboy economy” with that of a sustainable “spaceman economy” aware of
strictly limited resources and the potential finiteness of existential conditions.27
The metaphor of spaceship earth, which replaced that of the lifeboat,28 soon
gained popularity and was developed further by Buckminster Fuller and others.
Photographs of the earth taken from satellites, later by Apollo astronauts,
provided icons for environmental consciousness. The blue marble figured on the
cover of Stewart Brand’s “Whole Earth Catalog” in 1968. Consequently, Eugene
P. Odum’s book “Ecology and Our Endangered Life-Support Systems”, published
24

Cf. Taylor, “Technocratic Optimism,” 224. On the Odum brothers and the historical
relations between cybernetics and ecosystems thinking, see Claus Pias, “Paradiesische
Zustände. Tümpel – Erde – Raumstation,” in Stehende Gewässer. Medien der
Stagnation, ed. by Butis Butis (Zürich, Berlin: Diaphanes, 2007), 47–66.
25
On Eugene Odum’s intellectual background, see Hagen, “Teaching Ecology”, 704–
709.
26
Cf. Mauricio Schoijet, “Limits to Growth and the Rise of Catastrophism,”
Environmental History, 4.4 (1999): 515–530, 517f.
27
Cf. W. Patrick McCray, The Visioneers. How a Group of Elite Scientists Pursued
Space Colonies, Nanotechnologies, and a Limitless Future (Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2013), 23.
28
Cf. Hagen, “Teaching Ecology“, 709–713.
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in 1989, begins with a prologue on the Apollo 13 disaster as a general allegory of
ecology.
Probing the Limits
By these discoursive transformations, ecological questions in general and the
dominant ecosystems approach in particular become increasingly concerned with
the problem of finiteness. When the Club of Rome set out to model the future
dynamics of economic growth in the 1970s, the term ecology advanced to a
universal synonym for the limitations of nature itself, abandoning the historical
ideas of perfectibility and infinite progress as constitutive for human nature. In
1970, the Club issued a paper entitled “The Predicament of Mankind. Quest for
Structured Responses to Growing World-wide Complexities and Uncertainties,”29
which aims at developing tools for analyzing the existential conditions of
humankind on a global scale. The leading assumption is that particular problems
such as population growth, scarcity of resources, pollution, food shortage, and
educational deficits can no longer be treated in isolation and locally, but rather
represent a complex setting of interacting hazards that requires a systemic
analysis and treatment. The future of humankind is embedded into a horizon
which the Club of Rome dubs “world problematique”. This “problematique” is
defined by its global scale, dynamic and complex character, and especially by its
temporal urgency.
The paper on the ‘predicament of mankind’ laid the foundations for the
famous report The Limits to Growth, published in 1972, which was prepared for
the Club of Rome by a team of researchers of the Systems Dynamics Group of the
Sloan School of Management at the MIT under the direction of Jay W.
Forrester.30 Technically, the study is based on a model (dubbed “World3”) that
covers important global scale anthropogenic effects in mathematical terms and
allows to experiment with the temporal interaction of these effects by means of
computer simulation.31 Central to this approach are cybernetic considerations
29

The Club of Rome. The Predicament of Mankind. Quest for Structured Responses to
Growing World-wide Complexities and Uncertainties. A Proposal (Genf, 1970).
30
Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jørgen Randers and William W. Behrens
III, The Limits to Growth. A Report for The Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament
of Mankind (New York: Universe Books, 1972).
31
During the years, two updates of the Limits have been published, providing some
revisions and changes of the simulation methods and prognoses, cf. Donella H.
Meadows et al., Beyond the Limits (Post Mills: Chelsea Green, 1992) and Donella H.
Meadows et al., Limits to Growth. The 30-Year Update (White River Junction: Chelsea
Green, 2004).
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concerning the role of positive and negative feedback on progressive growth rates.
Assuming that the carrying capacity of the earth is limited, exponential growth of
parameters such as world population, fertilizer consumption, industrial capital
savings, or pollution lead to a global “overshoot” that is predicted to cause more
or less catastrophic changes until the world system settles to a new state of
equilibrium.32 The report to the Club of Rome thus transports the Malthusian
scenario of natural limits imposed on exponential population increase to the
digital age.33 The idea of limitations to growth provides a stable frame of
reference which remains valid for ecological thought up to the present. Recent
approaches to the concept of global sustainability and resilience, e.g., draw on the
concept of “planetary boundaries”, trying to define threshold values for
parameters such as species diversity, pollution, and population, with the goal of
“estimating a safe operating space for humanity with respect to the functioning of
the Earth System.”34
As a central innovation, the world model used in the Limits to Growth
follows a logic of simulation to the effect that ecology is no longer descriptive,
but rather construed as an operational setting that demands experimental
interaction. Tuning parameters such as population growth or industrial capital
rate, and observing the non-predictable outputs, is open to assume qualities of
playful action, which explains the affinities of scientific ecological modelling to
computer games of world simulation such as the “Daisy World” of Andrew
Watson and James Lovelock, or “SimEarth”.35
32

For critical discussion of the background and the reception of the Limits, cf. Schoijet,
“Limits to Growth”; Francis Sandbach, “The Rise and Fall of the Limits to Growth
Debate,” Social Studies of Science, 8.4 (1978): 495–520; Vaclav Smil, “Limits to
Growth Revisited: A Review Essay”, Population and Development Review, 31.1
(2005): 157–164.
33
In his book An Essay on the Principles of Population (London: J. Johnson, 1798), the
English cleric and political economist Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) developed
an influencing though controversial theory of the relation between population growth
and limiting factors such as famine and disease. According to Malthus, population
multiplies geometrically, while food supply increases only arithmetically, leading to
catastrophic future scenarios. Present Neo-Malthusian approaches extend the argument
from population growth and food shortage to other critical resources and environmental
factors. On historical discussion and recent debates in the context of the “Limits to
Growth”-reception, see Schoijet, “Limits to Growth”.
34
Cf. Johan Rockström et al., “Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space
for
Humanity,“
Ecology
and
Society,
14.2
(2009):
32,
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art32/
35
One of the earliest and prototypical large-scale ecological simulation environments is
Buckminster Fuller’s ‘World Game’ of the 1960s, cf. Christina Vagt, “Fiktion und
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While the Limits to Growth of 1972 are commonly supposed to have
substantially contributed to the rise of ecological consciousness,36 they did so
mainly by popularizing a specific scientific approach to ecological modelling, and
by drawing on a specific technical medium, the computer. The normative impact
of the “Limits” does not aim at a cautious treatment of nature, but rather serves to
promote the ideas of technical and social engineering.37 Which leads to the master
mind of the project. Jay Wright Forrester, electrical engineer and systems
researcher, started his career at MIT during World War II with the development of
servomechanisms for radar antennas and gun mounts. At the end of the war,
Forrester directed the development of an aircraft flight simulator. The work on
this project stimulated the design of the first digital computer, the Whirlwind
system, which laid ground for experimental research on military combat
information systems that resulted in the renowned SAGE (Semi-Automatic
Ground Environment) air defence system for North America.38
In the 1950s, Forrester turned from military environments to economic
management and in this context developed his theory of Dynamic Systems, which
is concerned with modelling and simulating complex systems that exhibit a nonlinear behavior. In the following years, Forrester applied his theory on different
scales, publishing books on “Industrial Dynamics” (1961), followed by the
broader socio-political context of “Urban Dynamics” (1969), and finally by the
global context of “World Dynamics” (1971). In the latter book, Forrester outlines
the computer model that underlies the World3 simulation of the “Limits to
Growth”, which was published nine months later. Supported by the seeming
authority of the most advanced and promising technology, computer modelling
here gains the status of a universal tool of scientific explanation as well as
practical management, irrespective of the domain or scale of application.
In retrospect, ecological systems thinking presents itself as a field where
the technical figuration of life and of nature becomes inseparable from the
naturalization and animation of technology. This reversibility, which is
characteristic already for the parallel conception of machines and human
Simulation. Buckminster Fullers World Game,” Archiv für Mediengeschichte, 13
(2013): 117–145.
36
In fact, the appearance of the report was well planned and announced in ways which
would trigger public interest in advance, cf. Sandbach, “The Rise and Fall of the Limits
to Growth Debate.”
37
This also applies to earlier cybernetically inspired systems ecology, cf. Taylor,
“Technocratic Optimism”.
38
Cf. Forrester’s autobiographical description, Jay W. Forrester, The Beginning of System
Dynamics. Banquet Talk at the International Meeting of the System Dynamics Society
Stuttgart, Germany July 13, l989.
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(working) bodies in the industrial age, is even more characteristic for the
information age, where computer programming, modelling, and simulation
become dominant techniques of knowledge as well as biopolitic practice, both on
the macroscopic level of ecology (‘world dynamics’) and on the microscopic level
of organisms, finally on the molecular basis of ‘life itself’.
From Ecological Systems to the Transformation of ‘Life’
One of the most prominent examples for the modelling and simulation of features
of ‘life’ on a micro-level is the algorithmic artefact ‘Game of Life’. The media
history of ‘Game of Life’ (in the following abbreviated ‘Life’) also brings forward
how the rise of ‘games’ as part of computer culture since the early 1970s is
interconnected with the popularization of systems thinking.
‘Life’ is commonly understood as a game that provides an example of
emergence and self-organization, therefore supporting concepts like ‘autopoiesis’
and ‘emergence’ that were brought into debate from thinkers of the second wave
of cybernetics.39 It is also known to be the most popular version of a cellular
automaton. It was first presented in Martin Gardner’s popular column in Scientific
American in October 1970. The basic algorithm was developed by British
mathematician John Horton Conway between 1968 and 1970. The original game
is played on a 2-dimensional grid, similar to a checkerboard that is populated with
so called ‘cells’. The development of any ‘Life’ pattern is determined by
Conway’s “genetic laws” for births, deaths, and survivals of the cell population.
The rules of the game are quite simple, and its very simplicity is part of its
success. Gardner listed the complete rules in his article from 1970:
1. Survivals. Every counter with two or three neighboring counters
survives for the next generation.
2. Deaths. Each counter with four or more neighbors dies (is
removed) from overpopulation. Every counter with one neighbor
or none dies from isolation.
3. Births. Each empty cell adjacent to exactly three neighbors--no
more, no fewer--is a birth cell. A counter is placed on it at the next
move.40

39

Cf. B. Clarke and M. B. N. Hansen, “Neocybernetic Emergence: Retuning the
Posthuman,” Cybernetics and Human Knowing, no. 16 (2009): 83–99.
40
M. Gardner, “Mathematical Games – The Fantastic Combinations of John Conway’s
New Solitaire Game ‘Life,’” Scientific American, no. 223 (October 1970): 120–23,
120.
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By repeated application of the rules to the subsequent generations of cells,
different patterns occur on the checkerboard. Because of the way patterns seem to
evolve to ‘life-like’ behavior the game was often described as ‘fascinating’ and
‘surprising’.
While it could be argued that computer games in general are an offspring
of cybernetics and therefore means of the proliferation of cybernetic systems
thinking, this certainly fits as a description of ‘Game of Life’.41 When ‘Life’
became more and more popular during the 1970s, it attracted significant interest
in different scientific disciplines, like computer science, economics, mathematics,
philosophy, physics and biology. Since ‘Life’ started just in time with the growing
distribution of a new generation of minicomputers it also became a part of the
hobbyist computer culture. The influential American microcomputer magazine
BYTE discussed ‘Life’ prominently already in its first issue in 1975, and editor
Carl Helmer dedicated an ongoing column called LIFE-line to the game. A later
issue (1978/3/12) gave detailed instructions for “Life with your computer” and
encouraged its readers to develop their own version of ‘Life’.
Until today, the computer is the essential medium of ‘Life’ and the game
is used to teach programming skills as well as to study pattern generating
algorithms and ‘emergent behavior’. It remarkably crosses and interconnects
scientific research with hobbyist computer culture, computer science with
biology, cybernetic ideas with simulation techniques. Within various scientific
disciplines it supports the transformation of epistemic practices that combine
aspects of ‘playful experimentation’, simulation techniques and computer
programming. A contemporary example for this function of the game can be
found in the price awarded scholarly book “Self-Organization in Biological
Systems“, published in 2003 in the series Princeton Studies in Complexity and
edited by Scott Camazine. In this book, ‘Life’ is used as an example for
complexity and self-organiziation and at the same time as a software-tool to teach
simulation techniques. Interestingly, the authors feel obliged to clarify that ‘Game
41

While games where already present in early cybernetic theory, with prominent
examples like von Neumann’s interest in the mathematical theory of games as a
possible application to economic theory, Turing’s references to chess as a testing
ground for advances in artificial intelligence or Shannon’s obsession with all kinds of
playful machines, it is not until the 1970s that computer-based games found their way
to popular culture. For a more detailed discussion of the relevance of games in early
computer discourse cf. Serjoscha Wiemer, “Strategiespiele und das Medium-Werden
des Computers. Computerschach als Faktor der Rekonzeptionalisierung des Computers
als programmierbare Maschine zwischen 1945 und 1960“, in Diskurse des
strategischen Spiels. Medialität, Gouvernementalität, Topografie, ed. by Rolf F. Nohr,
Serjoscha Wiemer, and Stefan Böhme (Münster: LIT, 2014), 83–112.
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of Life’ “is merely a stylized model of the dynamic evolution of a population of
organisms and without real biological relevance“. Nevertheless it is repeatedly
used as a point of reference, because “its simplicity makes it a good didactic
example.”42 ‘Life’ can be found in a list of programs for the simulation software
StarLogo, together with simulations of pattern formation in slime molds,
synchronized flashing among fireflies or colony thermoregulation in honey bees.
Within the broader field of digital culture, ‘Life’ is part of the distribution
of programming skills in conjunction with ideas of self-organization and
emergence as well as with ‘entertainment’ in the sense of fun and playful practice.
It is a striking example of a decentered distribution of knowledge and its
(re)production by algorithmic media.43 Algorithmic media like ‘Life’ can be seen
as elements of todays ‘nature-database’, re-codifying concepts of nature and
information.44
Ludic Function as Interdiscourse and Naturalization
The broad application of ‘Life’ from scientific research to entertainment can be
understood with regard to its specific features as a game. To further explore this
42

See Scott Camazine, Self-Organization in Biological Systems (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 2003), 81.
43
Within the field of cultural and media studies scholars like Laura Marks, Alexander
Galloway, and Jussi Parikka among others have contributed to a theoretical
understanding of “algorithmic media”, but the concepts are still in a flux. One common
aspect could be seen in the drive towards a neo-materialistic understanding of
algorithmic media that tries to overcome a traditionally staged “opposition between
mechanistic and vitalist understandings of (dead versus lively) matter”. Cf. Diana H.
Coole and Samantha Frost, eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics
(Durham [NC]; London: Duke University Press, 2010), 11. For the approaches of
Marks and Galloway cf. Laura U. Marks, „Thinking like a carpet: embodied perception
and individuation in algorithmic media“, in Ent-Automatisierung, ed. by Annette
Brauerhoch and Anke Zechner (Paderborn: Fink, 2014); Alexander R. Galloway,
Gaming: Essays on Algorithmic Culture (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press,
2006).
44
Referring to concepts of new materialism, German Duarte proposed the term ‘naturedatabase’ to describe the new relation between materiality and information that evolves
from the intensified interrelation of ‘nature’ and ‘technology’. As Duarte states
“nature-database can be understood as a new codification of ‘reality’ from which nonfix meaning derives and in which biological (material) and non-biological (technology
and information) coexist and are in constant transformation.” German Duarte, “NewMaterialism and Reification in the Infoproduction Era,” Communication +1, no. 2
(September 8, 2013), http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cpo/vol2/iss1/4.
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idea we will draw on Rolf F. Nohrs concept of the “naturalization” of knowledge
and Gerald Voorhees’ concept of computer games as “game of truth”.45 German
media scholar Rolf Nohr discusses the function of games within a general
framework of the discoursive circulation of knowledge.46 According to Nohr, a
characteristic discoursive function of computer games is that of “naturalization”
which is realized by “translating” elements of special discoursive knowledge to
the level of the common sense.47 A key attribute of this theory is the importance
of the ludic function of games as a performative process and how a general idea is
transferred to the level of individual perception and belief. By playing a game one
activates its aesthetic dimension not as an abstract, but as an individual, temporal
experience, where a game unfolds as something that is more or less defined in
relation to one’s active involvement and configurative actions.48 In other words:
to play a game is the subjective instantiation of an abstract form as a sensual
experience and therefore coupled with the temporality of perception and
subjectivity. According to Nohr, this “sensualization” should be interpreted as an
element of “naturalization”, which leads to the translation of special discourse
knowledge to common sense. Therefore computer games realize a “procedure of
integration” which is part of their function as “interdiscourses”.49 While Nohr
points to the function of games for the transfer of knowledge, this idea can be
complemented by Gerald Voorhees’ concept of the epistemological function of
games.50 Adopting the term ‘game of truth’ from Foucauldian discourse analysis
and applying it to the study of computer games, Voorhees points to the
epistemological relevance of games: “digital games model the discursive
formations that give shape to what is reasonable, what is possible and what is
45

Gerald Voorhees, “Discursive Games and Gamic Discourses,” Communication +1,
no. 1, http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cpo/vol1/iss1/3.
46
Rolf F. Nohr, “The Naturalization of Knowledge. Games Between Common Sense and
Specialized Knowledge,” in Logic and Structure of the Computer Game, ed. Michael
Liebe, Dieter Mersch, and Stephan Günzel, vol. 4, DIGAREC Series (Potsdam:
University Press, 2010), 130–43.
47
With reference to Jürgen Link’s theory of ‘critical discourse analysis’, Nohr
distinguishes between ‘special discourses’ of highly specialized knowledge, for
example in scientific discourses of economics, biology, mathematics etc., and a level of
‘shared’ or ‘common’ knowledge being part of the everyday of a given society (for
Link’s theory cf. Siegfried Jäger, Kritische Diskursanalyse: Eine Einführung, 6th ed.,
Edition DISS 3 (Münster: Unrast, 2004)).
48
Markku Eskelinen, “The Gaming Situation,” Game Studies. The International Journal
of Computer Game Research. 1, no. 1 (July 2001),
http://www.gamestudies.org/0101/eskelinen.
49
Nohr, “The Naturalization”, 137.
50
Gerald Voorhees, “Discursive Games”.
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foreclosed in a given historical moment, enabling critical scholars of
communication to better conceptualize the operation of power.”51
Game of Truth: Cybernetic’s Concept of Self-Reproduction and the
Invention of Cellular Automata
Following Voorhees’ suggestion to ask about the “given historical moment” when
‘Game of Life’ came into existence, it is not sufficient just to name the
publication of the rules and descriptions in Martin Gardner’s column on
recreational mathematics in Scientific American in October 1970. Understood as
an expression of a certain “epistemological force”52, one has to take the
conceptual foundation of ‘Life’ as an example of cellular automata more
serious.53 This leads to the epistemological presuppositions of ‘Life’ and to the
question how Conway’s rules of the game refer to the historical epistemology of
cybernetics. Media scholar Jussi Parrika identified Conway’s work as part of an
epistemological idea “to see nature as a computational process” and, in particular,
“as part of the history of mathematical organisms and simulations”. 54 When
Parikka discussed ‘Game of Life’ in “Digital Contagions”, his seminal study of
computer viruses, he pointed to the “key role” of self-reproduction and to the fact
that with cellular automata, the concept of self-reproduction was combined with
“principles of universal computation”.55 The crucial point is that ‘Life’ is a
leading example of the idea of the computability of nature by the means of
systems theory.
51

Ibid., 16.
Voorhees, “Discursive Games”, 13.
53
Since ‘Game of Life’ itself refers to the notion of ‘life’, it is of great importance to
reconstruct the concept of life that leads to the possibility of ‘Game of Life’ and to be
sensitive to the historical movement that ‘Life’ is involved in, how it is enmeshed in
the struggle of the reconceptualization of life as ‘information’. To look at ‘Game of
Life’ as a ‘game of truth’ in this sense might imply to try to reconstruct the ‘discoursive
formation’ that gave shape to the game. Including questions like “What are the
necessary conditions to make the formation of this specific game possible?”, “What are
the epistemological articulations and the power relations, that are specific to the game
in a given historical moment?”, “What were the epistemological concepts that could
lead to the formulation of cellular automata?”, “What was their theoretical function
within the ‘game of truth’ that cybernetics played in the 1940s and 1950s?”, “What was
their ‘strategic’ value?”, “What were the questions and theoretical problems that lead to
the concept of cellular automata?”.
54
Jussi Parikka, Digital Contagions: A Media Archaeology of Computer Worms and
Viruses (New York [u.a.]: Peter Lang, 2007), 232f.
55
Ibid.
52
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The basic idea of cellular automata was formulated by John von Neumann
in the 1940s.56 Von Neumann’s first approach to a theory of self-reproducing
automata was about an automaton that could materially reproduce itself.57 In
addition to this concept of a “Universal Constructing Machine” (also called
“kinematic model”) he later developed a second model of self-reproducing
automata, which does not pose the mechanical and material problems of the first
and which became known as the theory of cellular automata: In this approach, the
automata are based on a two-dimensional array of elementary “cells.”58 This
concept finally led to the invention of ‘Game of Life’ by Conway.
It is remarkable that von Neumann developed his initial idea of automata
as self-reproducing structures when he tried to find a mathematical description of
complexity. Self-reproduction and the theory of biological evolution served as a
key to von Neumann’s understanding of the meaning of ‘complexity’. He argued
that while natural organisms would show the ability for increasing complexity,
which would be the case with “long periods of evolution”, the artificial automata
would suffer from a “degenerating tendency” and a “decrease of complexity”.59
56

Claude Shannon summoned von Neumann’s ideas in 1953. The following paragraphs
are based on his subsumption of von Neumann’s approach. Cf. Claude E. Shannon,
“Computers and Automata,” Proceedings of the IRE 41, no. 10 (1953): 1234–41, 1240.
57
Von Neumann thought that, analogous to Turing’s universal computing machine, it
could be possible to “design a kind of universal construction machine […] The
universal constructing machine can be fed a sequence of instructions, similar to the
program of a digital computer, which describe in a suitable code how to construct any
other machine that can be built with the elementary components. The universal
constructing machine will then proceed to hunt for the needed components in its
environment and build the machine described on its tape.“ Ibid., 1240.
58
Claude Shannon gave a short and very precise description of the general mechanism of
von Neumann’s initial conception of cellular automata: “Each cell is of relatively
simple internal structure, having, in fact, something like thirty possible internal states,
and each cell communicates directly only with its four neighbors. The state of a cell at
the next (quantized) step in time depends only on the current state of the cell and the
states of its four neighbors. By a suitable choice of these state transitions it is possible
to set up a system yielding a kind of self-reproducing structure.” Ibid.
59
“Organisms are indirectly derived from others which had lower complexity“, but “a
certain degenerating tendency must be expected, some decrease in complexity as one
automaton makes another automaton.” See John von Neumann, “The General and
Logical Theory of Automata,” in Collected works, ed. Abraham Haskel Taub, vol. V
(Oxford; New York [etc.]: Pergamon, 1976), 288–326, 312. This statement is logical, if
one assumes that in order for an automaton A to produce another automaton B it must
have contained a complete description of B together with some instructions how to
build it and therefore A must have a higher degree of “complication” than B. (ibid.,
312). After von Neumann sketched the logical and mathematical description of an
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Looking at how von Neumann presents his argument in “The General and
Logical Theory of Automata”, one recognizes that at the beginning he is very
strict and careful to develop his theoretical comparison of ‘natural organism’ and
artificial automata only as means of interpretation for certain problems regarding
the understanding of complexity. But later that relation is reversed when he takes
the self-reproduction of automata as a model for the explanation of the selfreproduction of genes and the production of enzymes.60 It is precisely at this point
that an epistemological operation becomes functional, which Lily E. Kay
analyzed as “cyborg dialectic”. Cyborg dialectic points to a procedure where
machines and organisms are taken as a model to mutual explain the other and at
the same time narrowing both concepts, so that their distinction becomes more
and more blurred. According to Kay this specific cross-identity-conceptualization
of machines and biological systems is one of the characteristics of the first wave
of cybernetics.61 As Kay has shown in her writings about the history of science,
this cyborg dialectic can be found explicitly in the formation of the concepts of
the ‘genetic code’ and the reconceptualization of ‘life’ in modern molecular
biology. Within the ontological framework of cybernetics, ‘life’ was not only
regulated by cybernetic mechanisms of feedback and homeostasis, but it finally
became thinkable to understand ‘life itself’ as pure ‘information’.
Thus, at the time when British mathematician John Horton Conway started
his work on ‘Game of Life’ around 1968, he entered an already established array
of mutual conceptualizations of ‘living organisms’ and ‘artificial automata’. At
the end of the 1960s the idea of taking self-reproducing automata as a model for
the understanding and ‘calculation’ of biological processes of cellular
automaton with the ability of self-reproduction that could possibly be a solution to the
degenerating tendency, he proposed a direct comparison of the process of selfreproducing automata and living organisms, declaring “the copying mechanism B
performs the fundamental act of reproduction, the duplication of the genetic material,
which is clearly the fundamental operation in the multiplication of living cells.” (ibid.,
317).
60
Ibid., 318.
61
The concept of cyborg dialectic is developed as part of Kay’s analysis of the
epistemological shift of neuroscience in the theoretical works of Warren S. McCulloch
and Walter Pitts that played a crucial role in the ‘cognitive turn’ of the 1950s:
“McCulloch-Pitts neural nets and Turing’s machine became the twin pillars of early
automata studies and computer design [...]. And just as with Wiener’s cybernetics, in
which the nervous system became a model for negative feedback machines and, in turn,
the machine a model for biological systems, this cyborg dialectic obtained also in
logical automata.” Lily E. Kay, “From Logical Neurons to Poetic Embodiments of
Mind: Warren S. McCulloch’s Project in Neuroscience,” Science in Context 14, no. 04
(2001): 591–614, 602.
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reproduction on a molecular level was already in circulation.62 Some of these
conceptions privileged the phenomenon of ‘self-reproduction’ as paradigmatic
feature of ‘life’, while others were more structured by concepts of information,
program, feedback or complexity.
Artificial Life
While ‘Game of Life’, until today, is used for modeling ‘natural’ and ‘lifelike’
processes and as algorithmic medium for theoretical research across a broad range
of disciplines,63 a very distinct and specific role of ‘Life’ can be found within
artificial life research. Christopher Langton, one of the founding figures of
artificial life (also abbreviated A-Life) as an academic field of study, proposed to
acknowledge non-organic entities as ‘alive’ and proclaimed cellular automata as
preferred research tool.64 The ‘lifelike’ behavior of Conway’s ‘Life’ is a much
used ‘visual’ argument for this approach.65 It seems plausible that much of the
game’s continuous attraction is related to its visual attributes, how it “offers direct

62

As Evelyn Fox Keller has shown, ‘program’ and ‘computer’ became influential as
metaphors for the understanding of biological development during the 1960s, namely
with regard to genetic research and molecular biology. Cf. Evelyn Fox Keller, “Beyond
the Gene but beneath the Skin,” in Arguing about Science, ed. Alexander Bird and
James Ladyman (New York: Routledge, 2012), 125–39, 129f. Stahl is one of the early
researchers who also referred directly to the idea of self-replicating machines as
theorized by von Neumann; Apter (1966) emphasized the importance of logical or
computer models of genetic control and differentiation mechanisms, after François
Jacob and Jacques Monod, who had applied cybernetic concepts of ‘regulation’ and
‘control’ successfully to the description of biochemical mechanisms of enzyme
synthesis, were awarded with the Nobel Price in Medicine in 1965 (together with
André Lwoff). Cf. Walter R. Stahl, “A Computer Model of Cellular SelfReproduction,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 14, no. 2 (1967): 187–205; Michael
John Apter, Cybernetics and Development, International Series of Monographs in Pure
and Applied Biology. Div.: Zoology; 29 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966).
63
An ongoing interest in ‘Game of Life’ can be observed in mathematics, physics,
biology, chemistry, music theory, simulation theory, and other disciplines. A collection
of different approaches, with a certain emphasis on mathematics, can be found in
Andrew Adamatzky, ed., Game of Life Cellular Automata (London; New York:
Springer, 2010).
64
Christopher G. Langton, “Studying Artificial Life with Cellular Automata,” Physica D:
Nonlinear Phenomena, Proceedings of the Fifth Annual International Conference, 22,
no. 1–3 (October 1986): 120–49.
65
The reference of A-Life to ‚Life‘ has been discussed in more detail in Sherry Turkle,
Life on the Screen (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).
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visual evidence of how simple rules can generate complex patterns”.66 In this
regard, it is possible to identify at least two different aspects of the visual qualities
of ‘Life’: a) the aesthetic experience of movement or animation and b) the
pleasing unpredictability of pattern development with a rich diversity of
reoccurring ‘organisms’ (specimens) and designs in constant flux.
While the geometrical and topological features of ‘Life’ may be regarded
as a direct outcome of its specific mathematical foundation, this does not hold true
for its visual aspects, since the visibility and its perceivability as well as
perceptibility in general is not only an outcome of its mathematical structure but
also very much of its materialized processing by computer media and the related
graphical displays. This is an important aspect that exemplifies how algorithmic
media are relying on material processes, where ‘matter’ and ‘information’ are not
opposed but entangled. If ‘Life’ can be regarded a significant historical landmark
concerning the rewriting of the matrix of life, it is because its main feature is not
on the level of the ‘symbolic’ or in the register of ‘representation’, but how it
brings together concepts, code, algorithm, material calculation, and perception in
a dense process of mediation. At least from the perspective of new materialisms
or materialist media theory67 it would be wrong to treat ‘Life’ as an example of
the ‘immaterial’ essence of ‘life itself’ – since the very mechanism of computer
technology is the specific arrangement of ‘matter’ for the purpose of calculation.
Computers are essentially material devices, as media scholars have often
emphasized.68 One of their material features is the ability to display structures of
information and rule based processes.
To See It is to Know It - Aesthetic-Epistemological Power
Regarding the importance of computers as visual media, Sherry Turkle’s
description of her first encounter with ‘Life’ is an instructive example of how the
66

John Johnston, The Allure of Machinic Life: Cybernetics, Artificial Life, and the New
AI (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008), 10.
67
According to Milla Tiainen and Jussi Parikka, the new materialist approach can be
characterized by a “commitment to developing models of immanent and continuously
emergent relationality” as well as by a certain materialist understanding of media as a
“network of concrete, material, physical and physiological apparatuses and their
interconnections”. See Jussi Parikka and Milla Tiainen, “What Is New MaterialismOpening
Words
from
the
Event,”
accessed
April
1,
2014,
http://machinology.blogspot.de/2010/06/what-is-new-materialism-opening-words.html.
68
For example Frank Hartmann, Mediologie: Ansätze einer Medientheorie der
Kulturwissenschaften (Wien: Facultas Universitätsverlag, 2003), 11. Hartmann points
to the fact that „digital“ in the realm of the computer means that binary arithmetic is
switched electronically, which implies electronic engineering and material processes.
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aesthetic function of computer mediated mathematical processes structures and
rules the perception of a game’s ‘epistemological’ message. In Life on the screen
Turkle recalls how ‘Life’ began to challenge the way she thought about ‘life
itself’:
When I first came upon it, the Game of Life was running on a
small, unattended screen. Things came together and flew apart,
shapes emerged, receded, and reemerged. I remember thinking
about fire and water. The French philosopher Gaston Bachelard
had written about the universal fascination of watching fire, which,
like watching moving water, is something that people seem drawn
to across all times and cultures. There is repetition and sameness,
surprise and pattern. Fire and water evoke eternal patterns of life,
and now, so could a computer screen. In 1977, I stood alone at the
screen, watched the Game of Life, and felt like a little girl at the
oceans’ edge. At the same time I assumed that all life had to be
carbon based. […] But as I came to understand how he Game of
Life could be reset to generate complexity from initial randomness,
it took on another level of fascination. I saw how this evolving,
unfolding visual display might challenge my simple
preconceptions. Perhaps something about life could be understood
in terms of these evolving forms. I was intrigued by the idea but
resisted it.69
From a perspective of media theory, Turkle’s fascination with the visual
movements, reminding her of “eternal patterns of life” by resembling the
experience of watching fire and water, should not be understood as the analogue
to a “universal fascination” that is essential the same “across all times and
cultures”. Rather it should be understood as an effect of ‘animation’ specifically
related to the medium of the computer. It is precisely the visual display that is in
the center of Turkle being “intrigued by the idea” of life as formations of evolving
patterns and informational description of complexity. However, Turkle’s dense
rhetorical scene is not only instructive regarding the rhetorical potential of the
game to translate visual qualities into intriguing ideas, but also regarding the
reference to eternity, fire and water. As physical phenomena fire and water do not
fall into the realm of common ontologies of ‘life’ or ‘living organisms’. And more
so, “life” is commonly understood as limited, since mortality is one of the
essential properties of “life”, which is very much in contrast to Turkle’s
awestruck invocation of “eternal patterns”.

69

Turkle, Life on the Screen, 155.
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In fact, Turkle’s description seems to be closer to a familiar cultural
concept of ‘nature’ than of ‘life’. This might become even more obvious
regarding the overlap between Turkle’s affirmation of ‘(L)life’ and Hans-Georg
Gadamer’s description of “play” which he developed in his theory about the
artwork: Gadamer’s ideas about ‘play’ are directed against any individual or
‘subjective’ aspects of games, trying to reflect on ‘play as such’, apart from
personal experience or idealistic tradition. “Play” is described in direct
correspondence to “the mobile form of nature”.70 For Gadamer, nature itself is
understood as a play – without the necessity of human subjects involved:
If we examine how the word ‘play’ is used and concentrate on its
so-called metaphorical senses, we find talk of the play of light, the
play of the waves, the play of gears or parts of machinery, the
interplay of limbs, the play of forces, the play of gnats, even a play
on words. In each case what is intended is to-and-fro movement
that is not tied to any goal that would bring it to an end.
Correlatively, the word ‘Spiel’ originally meant ‘dance’, and is still
found in many word forms (e.g., in Spielmann, jongleur).71
In a manner that could be evocative of aspects of ‘Life’, Gadamer further explains
his idea about “play as such”:
The movement of playing has no goal that brings it to an end;
rather, it renews itself in constant repetition. The movement
backward and forward is obviously so central to the definition of
play that it makes no difference who or what performs this
movement. The movement of play as such has, as it were, no
substrate. It is the game that is played—it is irrelevant whether or
not there is a subject who plays it. The play is the occurrence of the
movement as such.72
Gadamer’s philosophy of play can help to explain how Turkle’s fascination with
‘Life’ transcended into a fascination of ‘nature’. The similarities between
Gadamer’s approach to play and Turkle’s narration of her impressions of ‘Life’
seem to culminate in the affirmation of certain aesthetic qualities of movement.
The patterns of ‘Game of Life’ can be attributed the quality of ‘dancing’ light,
visible on a computer screen. In Turkle’s description, ‘Life’ resembles “the
mobile form of nature” that Gadamer calls ‘play’.

70

Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd ed., Continuum Impacts (London:
Continuum, 2006), 105.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.,104.

communication+1 Vol. 3 [2014], Iss. 1, Article 6
22

Neubert and Wiemer / Rewriting the Matrix of Life

However, Turkle’s contribution to the discourse of ‘Life’ is more or less a
byproduct of her interest in the scientific project of artificial life (A-Life).
Christopher Langton, one of the prominent advocates of A-Life, follows the credo
that “the ‘molecular logic’ of life can be embedded within cellular automata”.73
As Langton states, the principle assumption made in A-Life-research is that “the
‘logical form’ of an organism can be separated from its material basis of
construction, and that ‘aliveness’ will be found to be a property of the former, not
of the latter”.74 For Langton, of course, this logical form is equivalent to an
algorithm, and therefore the “ideal tool” for the study of life is exactly the
computer.75 Following the ideas of a bottom-up approach, where “emergent
behavior” is thought of as an outcome of the dynamic interaction of rather simple
“low-level primitives”,76 A-Life discourse takes ‘Life’ as an essential reference.
Because it is not just a metaphor, but an ‘algorithmic machine’, it implies the
promise to bridge the gap between biological studies on complexity and selforganization in natural organisms or “biological systems”77 and the computer
based understanding of life as complex systems of information processing.
As the example of ‘Life’ shows, there is an ongoing translation between
epistemological and aesthetic reasoning, where the rhetorical function depends
very much on the specific mediality of games. While on the one hand, ‘Life’ may
be used as an example for the conceptual shift from a notion of ‘life’ as carbon
based to the idea that “’information’ can be ‘life’”78, on the other hand it can point
to the importance of aesthetic qualities as fundamental aspects of the notion of
‘life’ or ‘nature’. From a perspective of media theory, it is important to notice the
fact that the game’s ‘meaning’ is not only determined by its context and its
rhetorical instrumentalization for different strategic goals within the ‘game of
73

Christopher Langton, “Studying Artificial Life with Cellular Automata,” Physica D:
Nonlinear Phenomena, Proceedings of the Fifth Annual International Conference, 22,
no. 1–3 (October 1986): 120–49, 120.
74
Christopher Langton, “Artificial Life. Introduction,” in Artificial Life: Proceedings of
an Interdisciplinary Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems, ed.
Christopher Langton (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1988), 1–47, 11.
75
Ibid., 2.
76
Ibid., 2–3.
77
See Camazine, Self-Organization in Biological Systems. Due to its simplicity with only
a few rules to calculate the status of a single cell, determined by the status of its
neighbors, ‘Life’ is suited to the propagation of a hands-on approach to simulation
techniques, as it is common practice not only to experiment with the initial state of the
system, that is the specific distribution of cells on the two-dimensional grid, but to alter
the rules themselves.
78
Richard Doyle, On Beyond Living: Rhetorical Transformations of the Life Sciences
(Stanford University Press, 1997), 110.
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truth’, but that the meaning-making properties have slid to the process of
translation or mediation between ‘information’ and perception.
Final Prospect
Ongoing debates about biomedia show the traces of systems thinking on several
levels. Remarkably, it is not only the historic relevance of systems theory’s
epistemological project that irradiates contemporary ontologies, but also a strong
drive to use simulations and games as means of popularization. The world models
of system ecology and the games of ‘lifelike’ patterns both underline the
relevance of algorithmic media as part of the production and interpretation of (our
shared) reality. While the genealogy of systems thinking can be traced back to the
emerging ecological thought of the late 19th century, it is the technoscientific
approach of simulation that re-folds biology, ecology and systems thinking onto
another. Finally, the afterlife of systems thinking becomes more or less
undistinguishable from the afterlife of ‘nature’. Does this mean that world
modelling should be identified as the historical vanishing point of ‘nature’, since
system-ecological thinking is incapable of rendering anything outside as relevant
counterpart? Or how might one think any ‘outside’ of the ecological paradigm?
The debates between poststructuralism, systems theory and actor-network-theory
are haunted by the ghost of nature. A zombielike afterlife: It seems likely that
system-ecology aka “undead nature” keeps revisiting contemporary theory.
Following an argument of gender-and-media scholar Marie-Luise
Angerer, algorithmic media might circumscribe a new kind of mediatechnological
state, where the ‘interval of perception’ is ‘played’ in a way that technology and
life become “soldered” („verlötet”) in accordance to the conditions of electronic
affective temporality. This could lead, as Angerer argues, to a point where
technology and life, the social and the somatic, loose their mutual
differentiation.79
79

Cf. Marie-Luise Angerer, “Die ‘Biomediale Schwelle’. Medientechnologien und
Affekt,” in Situiertes Wissen und Regionale Epistemologie: Zur Aktualität Georges
Canguilhems und Donna J. Haraways, ed. Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky and Christoph
F. E. Holzhey, Cultural Inquiry 7 (Wien: Verlag Turia + Kant, 2013), 203–22, 210.
This idea of a biomedial threshold („biomedialer Schwelle”) is based on Angerer’s
reading of George Canguilhem’s philosophy of technology. Canguilhem developed his
philosophy of technology in distancing himself from the cybernetic “pursue of
hegemony” (ibid., 209). Angerer follows Canguilhem’s proposal to understand
technology as “universal biological phenomenon” (ibid., 208), as Canguilhem argued
in his essay Machine and Organism. Unlike in cybernetics, for Canguilhem technology
is not identical with rationality and teleological thinking. The assumed rationality of
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Referring to Foucault’s concept of the productivity of power, Richard
Doyle describes algorithmic media as elements of the “practice and tactics (what
Foucault has dubbed a ‘technological ensemble’)” that are involved in the game
of truth where “life gets networked, located, and articulated through a computer
screen”.80 In addition to the onto-aesthetical, epistemological, and rhetorical
functionality of algorithmic media, Alexander Galloway theorized their allegoric
power. He states that “to interpret a game means to interpret its algorithm (to
discover its parallel ‘allegorithm’)”81, but the playful actions that are necessary to
discover a game’s possible worldings are not acts of hermeneutic exegesis and
interpretation, but can be called ‘playacts’. Within algorithmic media, the
allegorical dimensions of a game are less on the level of representations but
communicate as playful actions: playacts refer to this situation of algorithmic
media, where we “do” allegory, rather than comment and reflect on it.
As part of the new compositions of the techno-biological and the technoecological situation of the 21st century, the example of ‘Life’ can help to avoid
some of the epistemological pitfalls and misconceptions that arise with the
ideology of simulation and the afterlife of systems theory in ecological modeling
of ‘Gaia’ and synthetic biology. ‘Life’ should remind us of the allegorical
qualities of algorithmic media, where the game of truth has not been played
through, but still requires ongoing playacts.

technology that is brought in opposition to life and is used as a model to gain control
and power over the living would then be an anthropocentric illusion. For Canguilhem’s
critique of anthropocentric concepts of technology cf. Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky,
“Kritik des Anthropozentrismus und die Politik des Lebens bei Canguilhem und
Haraway,” in Situiertes Wissen und Regionale Epistemologie: Zur Aktualität Georges
Canguilhems und Donna J. Haraways, ed. Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky and Christoph
F. E. Holzhey, Cultural Inquiry 7 (Wien: Verlag Turia + Kant, 2013), 105–20.
80
Doyle, On Beyond Living, 110.
81
Galloway, Gaming: Essays, 91.
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